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The notion of commodification refers to the degree to which the indi-
vidual is dependent upon the market for the satisfaction of his economic
and social needs. The welfare state has been described as having a decom-
modifying influence in that it provides the individual with the means to
maintain a reasonable standard of living while not working. An exam-
ination of the Israeli Kibbutz is undertaken in order to understand the
workings of an extreme case of decommodification. In Kibbutzim, there
exists a very highly developed system of welfare services that arc deter-
mined by individual needs and not by individual earning power. While
the nature of these communities clearly prevent direct comparisons with
the welfare state, the very fact that such highly decommodified societies
have existed for over seven decades should shed light on the debate over
the degree to which states can intervene with the play of market forces.
Introduction
The interrelation between the market and the welfare state
in capitalist societies has been a theme that has dominated much
of the literature dealing with the the welfare state. At its height,
the welfare state was regarded as a mechanism through which
the play of market forces is modified so as to guarantee indi-
viduals and families a minimum income, to narrow the extent
of insecurity by enabling them to meet certain social contin-
gencies and to offer a high standard of social services to all,
regardless of status or class (Briggs, 1961). One of the major im-
plications of the welfare state crisis and the growth in support
for anti-collectivist ideologies in virtually all the welfare states,
however, has been a growing tendency to re-introduce the mar-
ket into fields which, until the mid-seventies, were generally
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regarded as beyond its domain. The enthusiasm with which
governments of different political shades have sought to priva-
tize various aspects of the welfare system is but one facet of this
tendency (Doron, 1991).
In an attempt to understand the dynamics of the changing
relationship between the market and welfare state, researchers
(Rein, Esping-Andersen and Rainwater, 1987) employ the notion
of commodification as a means with which to describe the vary-
ing degree to which an individual is dependent either upon the
market or the mechanisms and institutions of the welfare state
in order to satisfy human needs. This essay will examine an
extreme case (Feagin, Orum and Sjoberg, 1991) of decommodi-
fication - the Israeli communal society called the kibbutz. This
society (or, rather, this group of communal settlements), which
has existed since nearly the turn of the century and today has
a population of nearly 130,000, is a unique, yet not irrelevant,
example of a society in which the satisfaction of the needs of
the individual is divorced almost entirely from his or her mar-
ket value. Indeed, it has been recently described as the "most
complete model of the integrated socialist welfare principle"
(Bar Yosef, 1985).Here, it will be proposed that the kibbutz is an
example of a nearly totally decommodified society.
The use of the term "commodity" in order to describe the
function of labour refers to the manner by which human be-
ings in capitalist society are defined solely in the terms of their
labour power. Depicting the free market economy as a stark
and antagonistic dichotomy between workers and capitalists,
Marx (1975) notes that the workers are totally dependent upon
their ability to compete in the market and obtain wages in order
to support themselves and their families. This puts them at the
mercy of the laws of supply and demand and at a disadvantage
vis a vis the employer, who has additional sources of income.
Indeed, workers are worse off than other commodities due to
the fact that the value of their labour depends upon its being
constantly exchanged. It cannot be accumulated nor can it be
saved. They have, therefore, no choice but to seek to constantly
sell their labour power at whatever price the market sets for it.
A century later, Karl Polanyi (1957) modified this idea in
his study of the evolution of the market economy in capitalist
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society. The rhetoric of free market aside, he notes, social protec-
tion in capitalist countries has undermined the idea of a market
in which human labour is solely a commodity. While accept-
ing that a characteristic of capitalist society is the tendency to
make one's life chances wholly dependent on his or her dispos-
able income, Room (1979) also emphasizes that "a progressive
divorce of wage and disposable income" has taken place in wel-
fare states due to the introduction of private, and, later on, state
social security systems, the progressive income tax system and
the development of state agencies which provide services for
citizens at less than their market value (p. 14).
This theme is taken up, and dealt with extensively, in the
writings of Claus Offe (1984) who identifies the relationship be-
tween the market and non-market governmental intervention
as an inherent contradiction of the welfare state. "A supportive
framework of non-commodified institutions, he notes "is nec-
essary for an economic system that utilizes labour power as if
it were a commodity" (p. 263). Offe, and Habermas before him,
employ the notion of decommodification in order to describe
a wide range of compensatory and market-replacing activites
undertaken by the state (Keane, 1984, p. 84). As such, any non-
market based state policy, be it the existence of social security
transfer payments, government expenditure on infrastructure or
the functioning of public health institutions, is grouped under
the notion of decommodification.
Gosta Esping Andersen and his associates provide the most
significant attempt to provide a formal and operational basis for
the notion of decommodification. They define decommodifica-
tion as "the degree to which an individual commands the means
to satisfy his or her social and familial needs independently of
the cash nexus" (Esping Andersen and Kolberg, 1991, p. 78). Es-
ping Andersen (1990) describes decommodifying welfare states
as those in which "the citizens can freely, and without potential
loss of jobs, income, or general welfare, opt out of work un-
der conditions when they, themselves, consider it necessary for
reasons of health, age, or even educational self improvement"
(p. 23).
The notion of decommodification assumes, then, that the
lesser the individual's dependence upon the market for the
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gratification of individual or family needs, the easier it will be
for him/her to opt out of the market. This act of freely removing
oneself from the market will be possible for most individuals
(except for the very rich) only because the welfare state will en-
sure the continued gratification of their needs despite the fact
that they are not earning a living as part of the market.
Taken to its logical conclusion, this equation should enable
us to create two theoretical poles on a commodification con-
tinuum upon which existing welfare states (or a single welfare
state in different stages of its development) can be placed. The
two ends of the continuum can be defined as a Totally Corn-
modified Society (TCS) and a Totally Decommodified Society
(TDS). The idea of a society closest to the notion of a Totally
Commodified Society (TCS) would be that proposed by clas-
sical liberalism, in which there is no state intervention in the
workings of the market and the individual is totally dependent
upon the market value of his or her labour in order to survive.
The logic of this society is obviously based on the capitalist
notion that the risks and the chances of the free market are
the incentives without which economic growth is impossible.
Wealth will be created only when unfettered individuals com-
pete freely in the market. Social policies, which interfere with
the workings of the market by providing incentives not to to
work (in the form of unemployment benefits, for example), will
serve as obstacles to a a successful economy. While a Totally
Commodified Society would seek ways to deal with the "truly
needy", it would presumbly take the form of a residual welfare
system that does not threaten the market as often proposed in
the works of contemporary New Right writers (Murray, 1984;
Freeman, 1981).
The notion of a Totally Decommodified Society (TDS) would
be one in which there is no connection whatsoever between the
market value of an individual's labor and his or her standard of
living. Society, through its welfare and social security mecha-
nisms, would ensure that, regardless of whether the individual
is a participant in the market or not, he or she would enjoy
a constant standard of living. The individual in such a society
would work, yet the nature of his or her work would not be in
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any way linked to the satisfaction of needs and desires. On the
basis of the Esping-Andersen notion, an individual in such a
society would be be able to freely opt out of the market safe in
the knowledge that this would in no way endanger the gratifica-
tion of his or her needs. Presumably, in the TDS social security
programs would be devoid of the time limits, conditions of el-
igibilty, or limitations on the levels and span of benefits, that
characterize existing social security programs and that seek to
limit moral hazard and discourage "scroungers" (Deacon, 1976).
Obviously, the very existence of such a society, in which there is
no link between effort and reward, runs counter to the accepted
wisdom of not only free-marketeers but also of the more cen-
trist economists and social policy thinkers. The need to strike
a balance between social security income guarantees and pri-
vately secured incomes has long served as an iron law for those
seeking to achieve economic efficiency (Okun, 1975) and main-
tain a willingness to work while, at the same time, ensuring the
existence of income guarantees that provide a safety net for the
poor, disabled, and unemployed (Burns, 1956). A TDS would
appear inherently inefficient and unmanageable to such views
and inevitably doomed to anarchy and bankruptcy. The Israeli
kibbutz would, however, appear to undermine this acccepted
wisdom (Maron, 1993).
The Kibbutz
The kibbutz is a term used to describe 270 communal set-
tlements in Israel. The first kibbutz, named Degania, was estab-
lished in 1911 as a rural community (Baratz, 1945). The founders
of the first kibbutzim (plural of kibbutz) were young Jewish im-
migrants from Eastern and Central Europe who sought to par-
ticipate in the Zionist effort to establish a Jewish homeland in
Palestine. Many of these young immigrants brought with them
the collectivist notions that were an integral part of the radi-
cal ideologies of the revolutionary movements then active in th
Eastern Europe. They sought to establish an egalitarian Jewish
society in Palestine. The leaders of the Zionist movement sup-
ported the establishment of collective rural settlements by these
young immigrants as a means of settling Palestine (Near, 1992).
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Since the first kibbutz was established, the kibbutz movment
has grown significantly. In 1991, 129,300 people lived in 270
kibbutzim, affiliated to three different kibbutz movements, scat-
tered throughout Israel (Maron,,1992). Nevertheless, they have
retained a number of key characteristics. They remain relatively
small, intimate communities. The size of the average kibbutz is
463 inhabitants (Maron, 1991, p. 12). Membership is voluntary
and dependent upon identification of members with the basic
values of kibbutz society. The decision-making process is still
based upon a large degree of participatory democracy. These
characteristics have ensured a high level of internal cohesion
on the kibbutzim.
The kibbutzim make up 2.6% of the population of the coun-
try. The population of the kibbutzim is similar in its demo-
graphic characteristics to that of the general population of Is-
rael. 10.2% are elderly, over the age of 65 (slightly higher than
the national average), while just below 30% are under the age
of 14 (slightly below the national average).
While at their outset,the kibbutzim were agricultural settle-
ments, today the emphasis is upon industrial production and
services. Nevertheless, most kibbutzim usually combine both
agricultural and industrial or service production. In both fields,
the role of the kibbutzim is far higher than their proportion in
the population. Thus, despite the drop in agricultural produc-
tion, kibbutzim still produce a third of the entire agricultural
product in Israel (Meron 1991, p. 38). Industry comprises two
thirds of the total kibbutz production today and is growing. The
kibbutz industries comprise 8% of sales and 9% of all industrial
exports in Israel (Kibbutz Industries Association, 1992).
The kibbutz movement has served as the object of extensive
study in a large variety of fields, in particular that of education
(Shepher, 1974; Shur, 1976). The issue of welfare and social se-
curity on the kibbutz and its implications for the welfare state
have, however, not been the subject of such scrutiny. In order
to understand better the manner with which the kibbutz deals
with these issues, it is necessary to clarify first issues of equality
and distribution on the kibbutz.
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Equality and Distribution on the Kibbutz
The notion of equality has long been associated with the
kibbutz and, indeed, has been the subject of much academic
scrutiny and polemics. Tumin (1967), for example, described the
kibbutz as an example of a society that has achieved near to-
tal equality. Other writers, particularly Ben Rafael (1988), have
indicated that social stratification does, in fact, exist on the kib-
butz. However, this stratification focuses upon status rather
than material differences between individuals on the kibbutz.
The initial attempts to institute equality in the daily life of
kibbutz members were a result of the socialist values of the
founders. The adoption of equality, however, was also a prag-
matic response to the demands of a national movement which
sought to establish agricultural communities for young East
European immigrants in the sometimes hostile, and certainly
harsh, conditions of Palestine in the second and third decades
of the century. Over time, and in response to the need to in-
stitutionalize the egalitarian nature of kibbutz life, the notion
of kibbutz equality became formalized in a series of documents
which set forth both the goals of the kibbutz and the kibbutz
movement, and also the rights and obligations of the members
and the community. In 1951, the Ihud kibbutz movement, the
largest and least radical of the movements, published a found-
ing platform which stated that the essense of the kibbutz was:
"... the building of a socialist form of economy and life in work-
ers' settlements that are based upon self-labour, equality of hu-
man value, full communality in the ownership of property, work,
production and consumption, communal education, full joint re-
sponsibility based on the principle of "from each according to his
ability, to each according to his needs" (Gadon, 1958, p.371).
The final part of the above statement, the adoption of the
principle that each member contribute to the community ac-
cording to his ability yet receive from the community according
to his needs, provides the basis for the notion of kibbutz equal-
ity. Not coincidently, this phrase also reappears in the Kibbutz
Code that was drawn up by all the kibbutz movements in the
1960's (Article no. 66, p.13) and has been ratified on a number of
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occassions ever since. On the basis of this passage, Shur (1983/4,
p.190) has defined the notion of kibbutz equality as "the sev-
ering of the link betwe en the contribution of the individual to
production and society, and the return that he (or she) receives
in order to fulfill his (or her) needs".
This attempt to establish an egalitarian society in which all
the needs of its members are provided by the community with
no link whatsoever to the earning capacity of the individual
obviously requires the establishment of a very unique distribu-
tion system. In fact, the modes of distribution that have evolved
over time on the kibbutzim differ between kibbutzim and ac-
cording to the goods distributed. In general, however, variations
of four distinct modes can be found on all kibbutzim (Gluck,
1980; Barkai, 1978). Certain goods, usually low value domes-
tic consumer goods, are distributed freely to all members upon
demand. Other items, particularly clothing and shoes, are ra-
tioned out or, more commonly, members receive allowances
aimed primarily at enabling them to purchase goods of this
nature. A third mode is usually adopted with regard housing
and certain durable goods. These are distributed on the basis
of a "point priority scale" based upon considerations such as
seniority, family size and health condition.
The fourth mode of distribution, and that most relevant to
the study of welfare states, is commonly implemented with re-
gard food (which is provided in a communal dining room) and
welfare (health, education and personal social services). These
are distributed according to need. Thus, budgetary constraints
notwithstanding, the kibbutz provides for all the individual
needs of members in these fields.
The Welfare Functions of Kibbutzim
The kibbutz can be seen as a kind of "communal welfare
state" with regard the welfare functions that it provides its
members. In seeking to deal with the needs of its members, it
has undertaken three distinct, though overlapping, welfare state
roles. The kibbutz serves as an intermediatory between the state
and outside agencies and its members, it enhances existing state
provided social services, and it provides directly services to its
members.
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1. The Kibbutz as an Intermediatory: In a number of different
fields of welfare state activity, the kibbutz serves as an interme-
diatory between the state, its institutions and other providers
of welfare services, and the members of the kibbutz. While the
state provides other citizens benefits and in-kind services di-
rectly, in the case of kibbutz members the process is different.
In principle, the kibbutz is the recipient of benefits and fund-
ing on behalf of its members. Members do not receive benefits
and services directly. Rather, the distribution of benefits and
services received for individual members of the kibbutz is left
to the discretion of the kibbutz.
The relations between kibbutz members, the kibbutz and the
National Insurance Institute (NIl) well illustrate this function.
The kibbutz member is formally classified as an employee of
the kibbutz by the NII, the primary supplier of social security
in Israel. In a process similar to that of other employers, contri-
butions on behalf of kibbutz members are transferred from the
kibbutz to the NIL. Unlike other citizens, however, the benefits
are also paid to the kibbutz and not to the individual mem-
bers (Ronen, 1978). Thus, old age benefits, child allowances and
other benefits are all paid directly to the kibbutz in the name of
individual members. Often, kibbutz members will be unaware
of the level of benefits received by the kibbutz on their behalf,
or even of the fact that they are eligible for such benefits.
In the field of education, the kibbutzim have their own edu-
cational institutions (often run jointly by a number of kibbutzim)
that receive funding directly, as any other local authority, from
the Ministry of Education. Health needs of kibbutz members
are dealt with by health workers (either kibbutz members or
salaried workers employed by the kibbutz) in a medical clinic
on the kibbutz under the auspices of the sick fund affiliated with
the Histadrut trade union federation. Thus, the educational and
health needs of kibbutz members are provided in the frame-
work of the kibbutz thereby considerably limiting the need for
contact between members and additional health or education
suppliers.
The intermediatory role of the kibbutz in welfare not only
provides the kibbutzim with a large degree of discretion (in
the health and educational fields) with regard the quality and
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nature of the services and the mode of distribution of resources
to members but also provides very significant financial bene-
fits. Thus, in the case of payments to the sick fund, the kib-
butzim as a sector, enjoy a discount of 16% in dues to the sick
fund (Tomer, 1993). With regard state social security, the same
is true. As noted above, by law members of kibbutzim are re-
garded as the employees of the kibbutz. Because they do not
receive wages, payments to the NII (which are compulsory and
based on a percentage of the wage in the case of employees) by
the kibbutz on behalf of its members/" employees" are based
on the upkeep of a single individual on each specific kibbutz.
This figure is generally much lower than the wages that serve
as a basis for NII payments on behalf of most other employees.
The implications of this system are that the kibbutzim pay a
particularly low rate of payments to the NII. While the benefits
that the kibbutz will receive on behalf of the individual mem-
ber eligible for benefits that are based on prior wages (such
as maternity leave or work injury benefits) will be lower than
those that it would have perhaps received if the members were
working in a similar position in the free market, it should be
noted that most social security benefits in Israel are universal
and based upon the average wage and not linked to prior in-
come. Therefore it appears clear that the financial advantages
of this arrangement for the kibbutz as a whole clearly outweigh
its disadvantages.
The reasons why the state and other institutions have
granted the kibbutz this intermediatory role and provided it
with a prefential financial status, can be found in both the po-
litical and financial spheres. In the past (and to a much lesser
degree in the present) the kibbutz movement enjoyed political
power far in excess to its size and proportion in the population.
This was due to the major role played by the kibbutz move-
ment in the establishment of the state and its position in the
dominant labour movement (Horowitz and Lissak, 1989). As
a result, members of kibbutzim were very significantly repre-
sented in the political elite in the first decade following state-
hood (Gurevitch & Weingrod, 1978). This is particularly true of
the Labour movement and the Histadrut trade union federation.
The kibbutzim were able to ensure that state laws (Weisman,
Israeli Kibbutz 145
1966) recognized their unique collective form (thereby ensuring
the kibbutz an intermediatory role in welfare and other fields)
and granted them a favourable finanical position. The same was
true with regard institutions, such as the Kupat Holim sick fund,
which were affiliated with the Histadrut.
A second factor has less to do with politics and more with
economics. The economic clout wielded by the kibbutz move-
ment (even after the severe economic crisis it underwent during
the late 1980s) is considerable. As representatives of a relatively
large, close knit and prosperous federation of producers and
consumers,the kibbutz movements have been able to negotiate
prefered treatment by economic institutions. A recent example
of this in the welfare field is the trend by competing pension
funds to offer kibbutzim conditions for joining the funds which
are better and more flexible that those offered other individuals
(Gilboa, 1992).
2. The Kibbutz as an Enhancer of Welfare Services: In addi-
tion to its role as an intermediatory between outside welfare
providers and kibbutz members, the kibbutz as a "communal
welfare state" tends to play an enhancing role. In various fields
of welfare state activity, the kibbutz utilizes its own resources
in order to augment existing services and provides its members
with far more generous services than those provided by the
welfare state to other citizens. Comparative studies of welfare
expenditure between kibbutz families and urban Israeli families
belonging to the sixth, seventh and eighth income deciles clearly
show that in key fields of welfare state activity, per family ex-
penditure on the kibbutzim is significantly higher. This enhanc-
ing role is especially marked in the health and education fields.
Thus, for example, the monthly expenditure per kibbutz family
on health reaches 159 IS (Israeli Shekels) while the average ex-
penditure of families in the sixth decile was 92 IS, 111 IS in the
seventh decile and 110 in the eight decile. The gap in expendi-
ture on education is even greater. The expenditure per family on
education on a kibbutz is nearly treble that of an urban family
in the eighth income decile (Shmueli, 1989 p. 22). The addition
in expenditure in the fields of health and education generally
takes the form of lower teacher-student and nurse-population
ratios on the kibbutzim and a greater readiness to spend more
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for the provision of additional educational and medical services
for members.
3. The Kibbutz as a Provider of Services: In a number of fields,
the kibbutz serves as the direct provider of welfare services to
its members, in a manner that is often very different from that of
outside society. The most outstanding examples of this are in the
provision of services to the aged and the personal social services
provided by welfare agencies working in the framework of the
kibbutz movements.
In the field of personal social services, services are pro-
vided by three primary sources-by "ESEK" a non-profit or-
ganization of social workers that operates under the auspices
of the two main kibbutz movements, by for-profit services run
by the kibbutz movements that focus on the needs of specific
populations, and by various private sources. The activities of
ESEK well demonstrate the providing function of the kibbutz
in the field of welfare services. ESEK covers all the personal
social service needs of kibbutz members in a majority of kib-
butzim. The service is comprised of 80 full and part time social
workers (all of whom are members of kibbutzim) who are di-
vided on a regional basis and generally devote one full working
day per week to an average sized kibbutz. The social workers
work directly with individual kibbutz members or with local
committees that deal with different social aspects of kibbutz
life (for example, the committee for the aged). ESEK is funded
jointly by the kibbutzim (in which its social workers are active)
and by the kibbutz movements. Thus, for example, the Kibbutz
Haartzi movement covers 50% of the budget. There is no direct
funding from the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare. The
only financial support from welfare state institutions is in the
form of indirect subsidies in those cases in which the office and
transportation costs of the ESEK social workers are covered by
regional councils which receive three quarters of their social
service budget from the ministry.
An additional source of personal social services are centers
that specialize in child development and in rehabilitation that
were established, and are run, by the kibbutz movements. These
centers provide for-profit services to both kibbutz members and
regular citizens (Kaufman, 1982). The costs for services provided
to members of kibbutzim are borne entirely by the kibbutzim.
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The kibbutzim also receive personal social services from pri-
vate sources. Members that require services that cannot be pro-
vided by the ESEK social workers (in the kibbutzim in which
they work) are able to seek professional assistance from outside
sources. In such cases, a request for payment will be directed
by the member to a committee on the kibbutz. If approved, all
the costs of the treatment will be paid by the kibbutz.
Thus, regardless of the form they take, all personal social
services required by kibbutz members are covered entirely by
the kibbutz and the kibbutz movement.
The kibbutz elderly, and particularly the impaired elderly,
are also the recipients of a unique system of welfare provision
(Reinharz, 1988). In seeking to deal with a growing number
of elderly members, the kibbutz has sought to provide for the
needs of these members within the framework of the commu-
nity. One of the unique features of this effort has been the
emphasis upon enabling elderly kibbutz members to continue
to play an active role in kibbutz life, and in particular in the
sphere of work. In the case of the impaired elderly, kibbutzim
have also developed a network of support services that in-
clude specially trained kibbutz members, alternative housing
options, group-care facilities, special means of transportation
and adapted workplaces (Bergman, King, Bentur, Holmes,
Holmes and Teresi, 1992). The costs of this elaborate system
of community assistance to the elderly is borne almost entirely
by the kibbutz without outside financial support.
Conclusions
Whether the kibbutz serves as an intermediatory, an en-
hancer or provider of welfare to its members, the nature of its
welfare system clearly places it within the realm of a Totally
Decommodified Society (TDS). 0 The distribution of welfare ser-
vices to kibbutz members is determined by individual needs
and not by individual earning power. Through a diverse range
of external arrangements and internal mechanisms, total respon-
sibility for the distribution of welfare services is in the hands
of the kibbutz, thereby enabling the community itself to decide
upon the criterion for qualification independent of outside in-
fluence, either by the state or non-state welfare state agencies.
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Moreover, the conscious dismantling of the connection between
the effort and material reward of individuals clearly provides an
extreme case of a society in which the individual is not commod-
ified, is not dependent upon market forces to satisfy individual
or family needs.
Does this mean that there is no link between market forces
and the needs of kibbutz members ? Not necessarily. The kib-
butz, as a community, is clearly dependent upon its joint earn-
ing power in order to provide for the individual needs of its
members. In principle, it cannot provide more than the sum
of the efforts of all its members. Obviously, in periods of eco-
nomic difficulties, the ability of the kibbutz to provide answers
to needs will decrease. This is what occured in the late 1980's
and early 1990's, during which high inflation rates, a severe
drop in government subsidies for agriculture, and mismanage-
ment in kibbutz industries, embroiled the kibbutzim in large
debts to banks.
These limitations upon the ability of kibbutzim to main-
tain a high standard of living for members, coupled with the
sharp swing in Israeli social and economic policy towards the
free market and privatization (Karger and Monickendam, 1991)
weakened support among many kibbutz members for the exist-
ing system. As a result, there has been a tendency among some
kibbutzim to adopt the "New Kibbutz" concept which seeks
to legitimize the concept of inequality on kibbutzim by imple-
menting fundamental changes in a variety of fields of kibbutz
life (Shafran, 1992/3). Basically supporters of this concept seek
to "privatize" kibbutz life by "allowing market forces and profit
considerations to have priority over social and value-related
considerations.., and by grantinhg consumer sovereignty to
the area of consumption and need satisfaction" (Rosner, 1992).
However, it appears that the changes in kibbutz society
have, until now, been relatively limited in scope and nature.
A recent study found that around ten percent of kibbutzim
have taken significant steps in this direction. Only a handful
have actually sought to link effort and reward (Rosner, 1993).
In practice, the emphasis has been primarily upon a restructur-
ing of kibbutz industries, deversification of economic fields of
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activity, and greater involvement of outside finance and man-
agement. Consumption has primarily been affected by cuts in
expenditure and a tendency to enhance individual discretion
over non-welfare goods. There has been no significant attempt
to change the modes of distribution of welfare services.
Despite the economic crisis and ensuing changes, the kib-
butz still remains an example of society closer to the TDS than
any other. Being a close-knit, voluntary and relatively homo-
ogenic society, the kibbutz has managed to ensure the contin-
ued existence of its unique social structure through a high level
of social control. While its very uniqueness, its size and his-
tory, preclude far-reaching conclusion with regard the welfare
state, the very existence of kibbutzim casts doubt upon the no-
tion that large degrees of decommodification will, by necessity,
undermine the economic basis of the welfare state.
Moreover, the social and economic mechanisms developed
in this society should serve as a subject of research for social
scientists and practicioners seeking to enhance the levels of de-
commodification on the state and community levels.
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